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Probabilistic Knowledge in Action
Carlotta PaveseAQ1 5
1. Introduction
According to a standard assumption in epistemology, if one only partially
believes that p, then one cannot thereby have knowledge that p. For example,
if one only partially believes that that it is raining outside, one cannot know
10that it is raining outside; and if one only partially believes that it is likely that it
will rain outside, one cannot know that it is likely that it will rain outsideAQ2 .
Many epistemologists will agree that epistemic agents are capable of partial
beliefs in addition to full beliefs and that partial beliefs can be epistemically
assessed at least along some dimensions. However, it has been generally
15assumed that such doxastic attitudes cannot possibly amount to knowledge.1AQ3
In Probabilistic Knowledge, Moss challenges this standard assumption and
provides a formidable defence of the claim that probabilistic beliefs – a class of
doxastic attitudes including credences, degrees of beliefs and partial beliefs –
can amount to knowledge too. Throughout the book, Moss goes to great
20lengths to show that probabilistic knowledge can be fruitfully applied to a
variety of debates in epistemology and beyond.
My goal in this essay is to explore a further application for probabilistic
knowledge. I want to look at the role of probabilistic knowledge within a
‘knowledge-centred’ psychology – a kind of psychology that assigns know-
25ledge a central stage in explanations of intentional behaviour. My suggestion
is that Moss’s notion of probabilistic knowledge considerably helps further
both a knowledge-centred psychology and a broadly intellectualist picture of
action and know-how that naturally goes along with a knowledge-centred
psychology. At the same time, though, it raises interesting issues about the
30notion of explanation afforded by the resulting psychology.
My plan is as follows. In §2, I summarize certain crucial aspects of Moss’
notion of probabilistic knowledge. In §3, I motivate a knowledge-centred
psychology and I show that this sort of psychology naturally goes with a
broadly intellectualist picture of know-how. In §4, I apply Moss’ notion of
35probabilistic knowledge to overcome some outstanding objections to a
knowledge-centred psychology and to intellectualism. The final section (§5)
raises two issues that distinctively arise for a probabilistic knowledge-centred
psychology.
1 I’d like to thank Sarah Moss for comments on an earlier draft. Unless otherwise noted, all
references are to her Probabilistic Knowledge.
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2. Probabilistic knowledge introduced
Onemight believe that it will rain. In this case, one has a full, or outright, belief
that it will rain. But one might also believe that itmight rain, or that it is likely
to rain, or that it is likely that it will rain if the clouds are gathering, or that it is
5more likely that it will rain than that it will not rain. Moss argues that these
sorts of ascriptions can be used to ascribe probabilistic beliefs (Chs. 3 and 4).
Moss defends two distinct claims about probabilistic beliefs: the first claim
is the probabilistic knowledge claim – that is, that probabilistic beliefs can
amount to knowledge. The second is the probabilistic content claim – that is,
10the claim that probabilistic beliefs, and hence probabilistic knowledge, have a
distinctively probabilistic content.
The alternative to the probabilistic content claim is the view that probabil-
istic beliefs are to be understood as complex probabilistic attitudes towards
simple non-probabilistic contents. On this view, believing, for example, that it
15is likely that it will rain is a matter of believing to a high degree that it will rain;
and believing that it is more likely that it will rain than that it will not rain is a
matter of believing to a higher degree that it will rain than that it will not rain.
Moss provides a battery of arguments to show that this view of probabilistic
beliefs ought to be replaced by a view on which the content of probabilistic
20beliefs – not their attitudes – is probabilistic. Accordingly, the content of the
probabilistic belief that it will likely rain is not to be modelled as the propos-
ition that it will rain, and not even as a proposition about the objective chances
that it will rain, about its evidential probability or about its subjective prob-
ability. Rather, it is to be modelled as sets of probabilistic spaces, where a
25probabilistic space is a mathematical entity made out of a domain of possibil-
ities, an algebra of propositions and an assignment of probabilities over that
algebra.
AsMoss (85) notes, the probabilistic knowledge claim and the probabilistic
content claimAQ4 are independent. Onemight endorse the former while clinging to
30a complex probabilistic attitude view. And one might endorse Moss’ prob-
abilistic content claim, while rejecting the probabilistic knowledge claim. My
focus here will be on the latter claim, my discussion in the following will
abstract from the probabilistic content claim.
What does it mean to say that probabilistic beliefs can be knowledge?
35Consider one’s 10% credence that it will rain. This is an example of a prob-
abilistic belief. Now, for that credence to amount to knowledge, it ought to be
true, for knowledge is factive. What does it mean for such a credence to be
true? Moreover, on many views of knowledge, for a doxastic attitude to
amount to knowledge, it ought to be safe – for example, it could not easily
40be false (e.g., Sosa 1999, Williamson 2000, Pritchard 2005, Larsonen-Aarnio
2010AQ5 ). What does it mean for a credence to be easily false?
In response to these issues, Moss (120–1; 154–5) argues that we can under-
stand the factivity and the safety of probabilistic beliefs in deflationistic terms
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starting from what she argues are their standard ascriptions. For example,
consider (1a–1d):
(1a) S believes that it is likely that it will rain.
(1b) S believes that it is more likely that it will rain than that it will not rain.
5(1c) S believes that it might rain.
(1d) S believes that it will rain if the clouds are gathering.
According to Moss, there is at least a reading of each of (1a–1d) that ascribes
to S a probabilistic belief: on this reading, (1a) ascribes to S a high credence
that it will rain; (1b) ascribes to S a higher credence that it will rain than that it
10will not rain; (1c) ascribes to S the probabilistic belief that has as its content the
set of probabilistic spaces whose domains of possibilities encompass some
possibilities where it rains; and finally, (1d) ascribes to S the conditional
credence that it will rain given that the clouds are gathering.
So far so good. Now, under what circumstances are these beliefs true? Here,
15Moss’ answer is deflationistic: there is nothing more to its being true that it is
likely that it will rain than its being likely that it will rain; and there is nothing
more to its being true that it is more likely that it will rain than that it will not
rain than its being more likely that it will rain than that it will not rain. The
same goes for safety (107). One’s safely believing that it is likely that it will rain
20is just a matter of not easily falsely believing that it is likely that it will rain; and
that amounts to nothing more than one’s not easily believing that it is likely
that it will rainwhile it not being likely that it will rain. The important lesson of
this discussion is that the proponent of probabilistic knowledge does not need
to give up the safety or the factivity of knowledge provided that one under-
25stands them in suitably deflationistic terms.
With this in the background, in Chapter 5, Moss argues that probabilistic
beliefs are the sort of doxastic attitudes that can amount to knowledge by
showing, among other things, that it makes sense for them to be justified or
unjustified and that they can be Gettiered. And in Chapter 9, Moss shows that
30probabilistic knowledge can be fruitfully employed in a defence of a know-
ledge norm of action, according to which it is permissible to act only on what
one knows, of the sort defended by Hawthorne and Stanley (2008), Weisberg
(2013) and Williamson (2015), among others.
Although I think that Moss has made a great case for this latter application
35of probabilistic knowledge, I think that probabilistic knowledge has a bigger
role to play in vindicating a picture on which knowledge enters central stage in
the practical domain. As some scholars have argued, the relation between
knowledge and action is, arguably, not merely normative but explanatory:
knowledge enters central stage in psychological explanations of behaviour
40(Williamson 2000, Gibbons 2001, Nagel 2013, Hyman 2015).2 In particular,
2 Williamson (2000) argues that knowledge enters in psychological explanations of behaviour,
with the famous example of the thief who keeps looking for the diamonds because he knows
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it enters in psychological explanations of intentional actions. The normative
claim that knowledge is the norm of action and the psychological claim that
knowledge enters in psychological explanations of behaviour are quite differ-
ent claims. The former is compatible with there being intentional actions that
5are not knowledge-guided and hence, in some sense, epistemically defective
but still intentional. According to the psychological claim, by contrast, inten-
tional action can only be there if knowledge is there, for intentional action is
explained, at least in part, by knowledge.3
The next section motivates a particular kind of knowledge-centred psych-
10ology. Then, the following section shows that probabilistic knowledge helps
fend off several objections to this sort of knowledge-centred psychology.
3. Towards a knowledge-centred psychology
A long tradition assigns beliefs a central role to play in folk psychological
explanations of intentional behaviour (e.g., Stich 1978, Fodor 1987, Lewis
151974, Loar 1988, Stalnaker 1984). But more or less explicitly, this tradition
confines psychological explanations to an explanation of attempts. As an il-
lustration of this, consider the usual example of a psychological explanation,
where one’s belief that there is water in the fridge and one’s desire to drink it
together are supposed to explain one’s attempt to grab a bottle of water from
20the fridge. Success happens when the world co-operates – when there is indeed
water in the fridge. If one’s belief is true, then one will succeed at finding a
bottle; if one’s belief is false, one will not succeed at finding water. The dom-
inant thought behind a belief-centred psychology – at least as I will understand
it here – is the idea that, as far as the psychological explanation of behaviour
25goes, whether the world complies (e.g., whether there is water in the fridge) is
irrelevant: what we want to explain is the fact that one attempted to get water
from the fridge, whether or not one has succeeded. And one’s belief that there
is water in the fridge, together with one’s desire to drink it, suffices to explain
one’s attempt, whether or not one’s belief is true.4
30This assumption that psychological explanation should be confined to
explaining attempts, rather than successes, relies on two questionable ideas.
that they are there; Gibbons (2001) explicitly argues for the role of knowledge in explaining
intentional actions by looking at a variety of examples which I will discuss later. Also, Nagel
(2013) defends the thesis that knowledge is a mental state and the role of knowledge in
psychological explanations. For another sort of defence of a knowledge-centred account of
intentional action, cf. Hyman 2015.
3 Moss (5–6: n. 4) discusses the role of beliefs in psychological explanation and the role of
knowledge as a norm for action but does not discuss the possibility of a knowledge-centred
psychology.
4 That a belief-centred psychology aims to explain attempts rather than successes is made
explicit in Stich 1998.
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The first is the idea that actions are decomposable – into attempts, on one
hand, and into bodily movements, causal chains or successes on the other. The
second questionable idea is that attempts are the only ‘mental’ components of
actions – that is, that whatever needs to be added to attempts to get an inten-
5tional action is non-mental.
If both of these ideas were true, it would be legitimate to confine psycho-
logical explanations to an explanation of attempts rather than successes. After
all, if attempts were the only mental components of actions, they would prop-
erly fall only under the domain of psychological explanations. On the other
10hand, if actions were not so decomposable into mental and non-mental com-
ponents, and if actions could be intentional – and hence mental – beyond the
attempts’ contribution, then this residual ‘mentality’ of actions too would call
for a psychological explanation.5
Indeed, there are good reasons to think that actions are not decomposable
15into mental and non-mental components and that even if attempts were in
some sense components of actions, the mentality of actions would not be
exhausted by the mentality of attempts. Here is an argument for this conclu-
sion. If attempts exhausted the mentality of actions, then provided that one
attempted to perform an action u, one’s eventual success at u-ing would have
20to be intentional. For on this picture, the intentionality, and hence the men-
tality, of actions would be exhausted by their attempt. However, there are a
variety of cases in which one attempts at u-ing, succeeds and yet their action
fails to be intentional. That suggests that the intentionality of actions cannot
be reduced to the intentionality of attempts; and intentionality being one mark
25of the mental, that suggests that the mentality of actions cannot be reduced to
the mentality of attempts.
For considerations of space, I will here consider only two illustrative exam-
ples of this phenomenon, both from Gibbons (2001). The first example is
Bobby and the Bomb. Bobby intends to kill his uncle by a bomb in his house
30and then, after moving a safe distance away, pressing the large red button on
the remote control device. He does not know much about how these things
work. He thinks that pressing the button will cause the bomb to detonate but
has no idea about the details of this process. His belief is true and, we can
suppose, justified. But here is what happens. A satellite, launched by the
35National Security Agency and designed to prevent bombings of just this
kind, intercepts Bobby’s transmission; this causes the satellite to send a warn-
ing to the intended victim; but, because of an unfortunate choice of frequency,
this causes the bomb to detonate. Bobby killed his uncle and caused the bomb
to detonate and did intend both things. But he did not do either of these things
5 Cf. McDowell 1995. Cf. Levy 2013 and Williamson 2015 for the point that standard action
theory assumes the decomposability of actions into mental and non-mental components. Cf.
Gibbons 2001 for a similar argument that psychological explanations should explain suc-
cesses and not merely attempts.
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intentionally. In this example, Bobby attempts to perform an action (killing his
uncle) and succeeds but intuitively his action is not intentional. Hence, the
intentionality, and hence mentality, of this action is not reducible to the in-
tentionality and mentality of the attempt.
5Now, Bobby and the Bomb involves a deviant causal chain. But there are
other examples of intended and attempted actions that are not intentional
which do not involve deviant causal chains. Consider a second example,
slightly revised from one given in Gibbons (2011): Cindy and the Lottery.
In it, Cindymistakenly believes that someone rigged a lottery in her favour and
10that she will be handed the winning ticket at the ticket store. On this basis, she
believes of a particular ticket that is being handed to her, that if she buys it, she
will win. She buys the ticket and wins. So her belief that she will win the lottery
by buying that ticket is true. It is even justified. Buying a winning ticket is a
perfectly reliable way of winning a lottery. But intuitively, she did not inten-
15tionally win the lottery.6
Here again, Cindy intends to win the lottery and attempts to do it by buying
a ticket that she believes truly and justifiably to be a winning ticket. No deviant
causal chain plays a role here in making the ticket the winning ticket. And yet,
Cindy’s victory is not intentional: fair lotteries cannot be intentionally won.
20That suggests, once again, that the intentionality of actions cannot be reduced
to the intentionality of attempts. But if so, we need a sort of psychology that
differs from a belief-centred psychology in that it is not only tailored to
explaining attempts.
A kind of psychology where knowledge, rather than belief, enters central
25stage is promising in this respect. To beginwith, note that both cases above can
be accounted for by a knowledge-centred psychology. Fred does not know
that he can provoke the explosion through his plan. That is why his success is
too coincidental to count as intentional. Lottie does not know that she can win
the lottery by purchasing that particular ticket. That is why her victory is too
30coincidental to count as intentional. More generally, if one possesses know-
ledge, then one’s belief cannot be lucky (Sosa 1999, Williamson 2000).7
Hence, a knowledge-centred psychology can explain why luck can undermine
the intentionality of Bobby’s and Cindy’s successes: by undermining their
knowledge. And it is independently plausible that an action based on know-
35ledge is sufficiently under one’s control to count as intentional.
Hence, a knowledge-centred psychology can be motivated on the basis of
intuitions about cases. But there is also a more theoretical argument for a
knowledge-centred psychology, one that hinges on the features that a psycho-
logical explanation ought to satisfy in order to count as a satisfactory
6 Cath (2015) argues against Gibbons’ example being a case of intentional action without
knowledge. But see Pavese 2018 for a reply.
7 Some object to a modal requirement on knowledge. See Beddor and Pavese 2018 for a recent
defence.
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explanation of its intended explanandum.8 Good explanations ought to be
counterfactually robust (Railton 1981, Woodward 2000, Strevens 2008). In
other words, an explanation of an event that deserves the name ought to hold
in a variety of sufficiently similar situations. For example, a satisfactory ex-
5planation of a car accident ought to show that the car accident would also
have happened in a variety of sufficiently similar situations.
Now, psychological explanations of actions can be modally robust only
provided that the beliefs that they invoke are themselves counterfactually ro-
bust. For example, if my reaching for the bottle in the fridge has been caused by
10my belief that there is the bottle in the fridge, and if my belief is not robust, an
explanation of my success invoking that belief will not be counterfactually
robust, for it will fail in some sufficiently similar circumstances. Hence, it will
not be a satisfactory explanation of my success at satisfying my thirst. That
means that for psychological explanations of actions to be good explanations,
15they ought to invoke modally robust beliefs. This provides some theoretical
motivation for thinking that knowledge is the best candidate to feature in
satisfactory explanations of actions, for even justified true beliefs give no
guarantee of being sufficiently modally robust, if they fall short of knowledge.
These are some of the motivations for a knowledge-centred psychology (for
20other motivations, see Nagel 2013). My final point in this section is that this
sort of knowledge-centred psychology marries well with a broadly intellec-
tualist view of know-how and action. First note that the kind of knowledge
that, on a knowledge-centred psychology, explains intentional action is exact-
ly the same kind of knowledge that, on a broadly intellectualist picture, is
25required by know-how. To see this, consider the kind of knowledge that
would be needed for explaining intentional action. Start with Goldman’s
(1970) action theory, according to which one intentionally us when one has
a plan to u, where a plan to u is a belief that specifies the means to u (cf. also
e.g., Audi 1986, Bratman 1987, Ginet 1990, Harman 1976, Velleman 1989/
302007, Mele and Moser 1994):
(Intentionality/Belief) If s intentionally us, then there are some means
m1, . . ., mn to u such that s truly believes that m1, . . ., mn are means for
oneself to u.
(Intentionality/Knowledge) can be formulated along the same lines:
35(Intentionality/Knowledge) If s intentionallyus, then thereare somemeans
m1, . . ., mn to u such that s knows that m1, . . ., mn are means for oneself
to u.
This is, incidentally, the sort of knowledge that Bobby and Cindy lack in the
previous examples.
8 For arguments for a knowledge-centred psychology that highlight the modal profile of explan-
ations, see Greco 2016 and Pavese 2018. For more theoretical considerations in favour of a
knowledge-centred psychology, see Nagel 2013.
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Now, according to standard formulations of intellectualism (Stanley and
Williamson 2001, Stanley 2011, Pavese 2015, 2017), one knows how to u
only if, for some means w to u, one knows that w is a means for one to u:
(Intellectualism aboutKnow-How) sknowshow tou is at least in part of a
5matter of knowing, for some means w to u, s knows that w is a means for
oneself to u.9
Hence, the knowledge that (Intentionality/Knowledge) requires for intention-
al action is the same that intellectualists require for know-how.
In fact, a knowledge-centred psychology and intellectualism about
10know-how are strictly connected views, supporting each other. Start from
(Know-How/Intentionality), endorsed by many scholars, intellectualists and
anti-intellectualists alike (Ryle 1949, Stanley and Williamson 2001, Stanley
2011, Hawley 2003, Hornsby 2011, Setiya 2012, Pavese 2015, 2017, 2018):
(Know-how/Intentionality) If s intentionally us, s knows how to u.
15Furthermore, suppose that (Intentionality/Knowledge) is true and so that the
intentionality of an action is to be explained at least in part in terms of prop-
ositional knowledge. Then by (Know-how/Intentionality) and (Intentionality/
Knowledge), we get that if one intentionally us, one both knows how to u and
one has propositional knowledge of some means to u:
20(Know-how, Intentionality,Knowledge) If s intentionallyus, sbothknows
how tou and for somemeansm1, . . .,mn, s knows that meansm1, . . .,mn
are means for oneself to u.
The intellectualist picture provides the best explanation for why (Know-How,
Intentionality, Knowledge) should hold. According to this explanation,
25(Know-How, Intentionality, Knowledge) is true not just because of a coinci-
dental aligning of propositional knowledge and know-how in intentional ac-
tion. Rather, its truth is grounded on the very nature of know-how.
But there is also an argument that goes in the other direction – that is, from
intellectualism to a knowledge-centred psychology. Suppose that both
30(Intellectualism about Know-How) and (Know-How/Intentionality) are
true. Then, the intentionality of an action by an agent requires knowledge
of the means to perform it. Hence, intentional action is guided by knowledge
– that is, (Intentionality/Knowledge) follows. A knowledge-centred psych-
ology not only invites an intellectualist view of know-how and action but is
35also motivated by it.
9 I am stating intellectualism as the view that know-how requires knowledge of the means for
action. Stating intellectualism as a fully reductive claim would require talking about practical
modes of presentation, which I cannot discuss here.
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4. Probabilistic knowledge, knowledge-centred psychology and intellec-
tualism about know-how
So far, I outlined a picture on which a knowledge-centred psychology should
replace a belief-centred psychology and on which a knowledge-centred psych-
5ology marries well with a broadly intellectualist picture of know-how. In this
section, I want to show thatMoss’ probabilistic knowledge considerably helps
with a defence of this general picture. In particular, several objections to
(Intentionality/Knowledge) and to (Intellectualism about Know-How) can
be overcome if one accepts Moss’s notion of probabilistic knowledge.
10The first sort of objection comes from the case of basic actions. Take an
action u that is basic for a subject s at a time t. What knowledge, if any, must s
have in order to intentionally u at t? Suppose it was the knowledge that some
further actionw-ing was required foru-ing. Then,uwould not be basic for s at
t. For there would be another action w that smust perform in order to perform
15u. That means if any knowledge is involved in explaining s’s performing a
basic actionu intentionally, it must be knowledge thatw-ing is ameans for one
to u, where w-ing is not an action itself but rather a matter of intending to
perform one (cf. Goldman 1970: 66, Setiya 2012: 291).
With this in the background, consider the case of Mary suggested by Setiya
20(2012: 291–5). Mary’s arm has been paralyzed for some time. AlthoughMary
has in fact healed, she does not fully believe that she has. Hence, at the time of
trying to clench her fist, she does not believe that she is able to clench her fist
nor does she believe that she can clench it by intending to do so. Call this case
‘Clenching’. According to Setiya, this does not stop Mary from clenching her
25fist intentionally, if she intends to do so. If one accepts the assumption that
Mary’s clenching is intentional on that occasion, it follows by (Know-How/
Intentionality) that Mary knows how to clench her fist – even though she does
not believe that she is able to clench her fist by intending to do so. The example
is at once a putative counterexample to (Intellectualism about Know-How)
30and a putative counterexample to (Intentionality/Knowledge), for it supposed-
ly shows that knowing how to perform a basic action does not require full
belief, let alone knowledge; and that intentionally performing a basic action
does not require full belief, let alone knowledge.10
Probabilistic knowledge to the rescue! If one appeals to probabilistic know-
35ledge, one can accept thatMary’s performance is intentional and yet insist that
her performance is guided by knowledge.11 After all, as Setiya (2008: 391)
acknowledges, a more fine-grained psychology encompassing degrees of
beliefs may provide a more accurate description of this case: Mary plausibly
has some degrees of belief that she will succeed at clenching her fist that makes
10 An earlier version of this argument appeared in Setiya 2008: 405.
11 In Pavese 2018, I consider a different response, according to which Mary does not intention-
ally clench her fist.
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the effort of trying worthwhile. Standard epistemology tells us that this cre-
dence cannot amount to knowledge: if so, Setiya’s (2012) objection stands. But
if Moss’ probabilistic knowledge claim is correct, then this credence, though
less than a full belief, can amount to probabilistic knowledge, thenMary’s case
5can no longer be used as a case of intentional action or of know-how without
knowledge.
Hence, probabilistic knowledge helps fend off the objection from basic
actions. Consider a different sort of objection, relying on cases of subjects
differing in their full beliefs but not in their know-how nor in the intentionality
10of their performances. Two basketball players, Emma and John, attempt a
three-points shot. Suppose they have the same chances of success, the same
track record of successes and the same evidence that they can succeed. But
suppose Emma is just slightly less confident than John that she can do it. In
fact, John has a full belief that he will succeed at sinking the basket by shooting
15as he usually does, whereas Emma fails to have such a full belief. First ques-
tion: if they both succeeded, is it not plausible that they would have done so
intentionally, despite their slightly difference in confidence? However, if
knowledge requires full belief, a knowledge-centred psychology incorrectly
predicts that only John intentionally sank the basket. Second question: is it
20not intuitive that both John and Emma can know how to sink the basket on
this occasion? However, if know-how required full belief about what one can
do, only John knew how to sink the basket on that occasion.12
Probabilistic knowledge to the rescue! Although John has a full belief that
Emma lacks, both have some degree of confidence that they will succeed, and
25since in both cases their confidence is based on the same evidence, in both cases
their degree of confidence might amount to knowledge. As soon as we follow
Moss in allowing doxastic attitudes other than outright beliefs to be candi-
dates for knowledge, this second putative objection also vanishes.
Thus far, I have considered objections to a knowledge-centred psychology
30that are also objections to a full-belief requirement on intentional action. Let
me consider an objection that distinctively targets the knowledge requirement.
Consider Archie who attempts to shoot a target. An expert archer such as he is,
he does what he would do in any similar situation in which the wind is quiet.
But suppose a gust of wind could easily divert his shot, although it does not.
35His shot can be intentional, it seems, and he might even know how to hit the
target, even though his belief about how he can hit the target in that circum-
stance is unsafe. After all, the way he shot in that circumstance might easily not
have been successful, if the gust of wind had intervened.
Probabilistic knowledge to the rescue! The proponent of probabilistic
40knowledge could object that Archie’s belief is probabilistic: it is the probabil-
istic belief that shooting in a certain way is sufficiently likely, given certain
normal circumstances, to lead to successfully hitting the target. We might
12 I owe to Littlejohn (c.) a version of this challenge.
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think of this probabilistic belief as a conditional credence: a credence that
assigns sufficiently high probability to hitting the target by shooting in a cer-
tain way, conditionally on certain normal circumstances being in place. This
conditional credence can be safe in this circumstance, and even be knowledge,
5for in normal circumstances it would not easily be the case that shooting in
that way would not likely be successful.
More generally, it is independently plausible that the content of one’s know-
ledge in (Intentionality/Knowledge) and (Intellectualism about Know-How)
ought to be spelled out in probabilistic terms. To see this, start with
10(Intentionality/Knowledge). It requires that one has knowledge, of some
means, that they are means for one to F. What does it mean for some means
to be means for one to u? Not that, for some way w of u-ing, one will u by w-
ing: that is far too strong, for one might intentionally u even though one has
some doubts about whether one will succeed (Goldman 1970, Harman 1976).
15For example, consider Davidson’s (1971: 50, 1978: 91–94) example of a man
who is intentionally making 10 carbon copies as he writes but does not know
that he will succeed in so doing. Or consider Bratman’s (1987: 37–38) case
where one intends tomail the bills on the way to work but one knows that they
are forgetful and so doesn’t know that they will actually do it. If knowledge is
20involved in explaining the intentionality of the action, it cannot be the know-
ledge that one will succeed at it.
Should the relevant knowledge be that, for some means w of u-ing, one
would in most cases succeed at u-ing by w-ing? This is also too strong: one
might intentionally u even though one might fail in most circumstances, as the
25baseball player who fails at batting 19 times out of 20 may nonetheless inten-
tionally batted the one time they succeeded. That suggests that the relevant
knowledge is that, for some means w of u-ing, one could u by w-ing. But what
does it mean that one could u by w-ing, if not that one is sufficiently likely to u
by w-ing, where what counts as sufficiently likely may vary from task to
30task?13 This gives us:
(Intentionality/ProbabilisticKnowledge) If s successfully and intentionally
us at t, then at t s knows, for some means w of u-ing, that oneself is suffi-
ciently likely to u by w-ing.
Finally, consider Intellectualism about Know-How. In the original formula-
35tion, it is the view according to which knowing how to u is at least in part a
matter of knowing that certain means are means for one to u. But what does
that mean? We do not want to require, for some means to be means for one to
u that one’sw-ing invariably result in one’s successfullyu-ing; nor that it result
in one’s successfully u-ing in most cases. That would be too demanding: after
40all, Babe Ruth does know how to hit a home run and yet fails at successfully
hitting a home run inmany circumstances. In order forw to be away for one to
13 Cf. Beddor and Pavese (2018), who suggest understanding abilities in probabilistic terms.
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u, all that is required is for one to be sufficiently likely to successfully u by w-
ing, where what counts as ‘sufficiently likely’ may vary with the task at hand
(and the circumstances under which the task is being performed). This gets us
to:
5(Intellectualism about Know-How) s knows how to u only if, for some
means w for s to u, s knows that it is sufficiently likely for oneself to
succeed at u-ing by w-ing.
Hence, if one unpacks the clausemeans for one to u, a plausible upshot is that
both (Intellectualism about Know-How) and (Intentionality/Knowledge)
10should be stated by use of a probabilistic language: they both require know-
ledge that one is sufficiently likely to succeed at u-ing through certain means.
These ascriptions are the sort of ascriptions that, according to Moss (2018),
can be used to ascribe probabilistic knowledge.
Appealing to probabilistic knowledge in understanding (Intentionality/
15Knowledge) and (Intellectualism about Know-How) anticipates a final objec-
tion. As Setiya (2012: 294) observes, it seems that one could intentionally
perform an action, or know how to perform it, without possessing the concept
could. And it seems plausible that one can know how to u and that one can
intentionally u even if one is not able to assess the objective chances of one’s
20succeeding at u-ing or even if one is not able to assess the likelihood of that
outcome on one’s evidence. For example, Fido can know how to bring the
bone back and can do it intentionally without being able to make any of these
sophisticated assessments.
Probabilistic knowledge to the rescue! By appeal to probabilistic know-
25ledge, the proponent of a knowledge-centred psychology can allow for not
very sophisticated agents to be able to perform intentional actions as well as to
possess the relevant know-how. For example, Fidomight have a high degree of
confidence that they will bring the bones back and that credence can count as
knowledge, even if Fido cannot entertain a proposition about the likelihood of
30their success.
5. Probabilistic knowledge-centred psychology
In conclusion, the appeal to probabilistic knowledge helps fend off some out-
standing objections to a knowledge-centred picture of intentional action. This
suggests that a knowledge-centred psychology might best be understood as a
35probabilistic knowledge-centred psychology. Let me conclude by briefly men-
tioning two potential issues that distinctively arise for a probabilistic
knowledge-centred psychology.
In §3, we have seen that satisfactory psychological explanations of behav-
iour, qua explanations, ought to be modally robust. That means that for
40probabilistic knowledge to figure in psychological explanations of intentional
actions, what it means ought to be intelligible for the corresponding belief to
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be modally robust. This imposes additional pressure on the issue of the intel-
ligibility of the safety of probabilistic beliefs.
As we have seen, Moss (104) gives a deflationistic answer to this question.
For one’s probabilistic belief that it is sufficiently likely that it will rain to be
5safe is simply for one not to easily believe that it is sufficiently likely that it will
rain while it is not – that is, for it to be the case that in nearby worlds where one
has that belief, it is sufficiently likely that it will rain. A worry with this
deflationistic account is that, asMoss herself acknowledges (36–37), sentences
and ascriptions containing probabilistic expressions can sometimes be used to
10assert or ascribe probabilistic contents, while at other times they can be used to
assert or ascribe contents about objective chances or about contextually deter-
mined bodies of evidence. If so, what guarantees that a safety clause for a belief
ascription is understandable and intelligible not only when it receives a non-
probabilistic readings but also when it receives a probabilistic reading?
15Relatedly, on a probabilistic knowledge-centred psychology, the question of
what is the intended explanandum becomes urgent. One motivation for a
knowledge-centred psychology, as we have seen, is that intentional successes,
and not simply attempts, need explaining. Now consider a probabilistic
knowledge-centred psychology. Would such a psychology explain the success
20itself? Or only that the success is sufficiently likely? Probabilistic knowledge
might explain probabilistic facts – or likely-successes. It is unclear that it can
explain the successes themselves. This issue needs more discussion than I can
provide here. But the general thought is that replacing a knowledge-centred
psychology with a probabilistic knowledge-centred psychologymight demand
25a retreat from an explanation of intentional successes to an explanation of
something less than intentional successes. Whether this retreat is really un-
desirable or whether it can be avoided are issues that I have to leave for further
discussion.
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